Redesigning the Pell Grant Program for the Twenty-First Century by Baum, Sandy & Scott-Clayton, Judith E.
The Hamilton Project  •  Brookings  1
Sandy Baum and Judith Scott-Clayton
DISCUSSION PAPER 2013-04  |  OCTOBer 2013
Redesigning the Pell Grant Program 
for the Twenty-First Century
2  Informing Students about Their College Options: A Proposal for Broadening the Expanding College Opportunities Project
The Hamilton Project seeks to advance America’s promise 
of opportunity, prosperity, and growth.
 
We believe that today’s increasingly competitive global economy 
demands public policy ideas commensurate with the challenges 
of the 21st Century. The Project’s economic strategy reflects a 
judgment that long-term prosperity is best achieved by fostering 
economic growth and broad participation in that growth, by 
enhancing individual economic security, and by embracing a role 
for effective government in making needed public investments.
 
Our strategy calls for combining public investment, a secure social 
safety net, and fiscal discipline. In that framework, the Project 
puts forward innovative proposals from leading economic thinkers 
— based on credible evidence and experience, not ideology or 
doctrine — to introduce new and effective policy options into the 
national debate.
 
The Project is named after Alexander Hamilton, the nation’s 
first Treasury Secretary, who laid the foundation for the modern 
American economy. Hamilton stood for sound fiscal policy, 
believed that broad-based opportunity for advancement would 
drive American economic growth, and recognized that “prudent 
aids and encouragements on the part of government” are 
necessary to enhance and guide market forces. The guiding 
principles of the Project remain consistent with these views.
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council agrees with the specific proposals. This discussion paper is offered in that spirit.
2  redesigning the Pell Grant Program for the Twenty-First century
Abstract
Since its inception in 1972, the Pell Grant program has expanded dramatically in size and scope. With 9.4 million individuals 
receiving $35 billion in funds in 2011–12 for programs ranging from short-term certificates in automotive technology to four-
year degrees in art history, the program is the federal government’s flagship effort to develop both general human capital and 
specific workforce skills. Yet the structure of the program—a one-size-fits-all voucher originally designed for recent high school 
graduates from poor families—has remained fundamentally unchanged. In the face of growing concerns about the sustainability 
of current funding, as well as increasing frustration with low rates of degree completion, we argue that the time has come to 
comprehensively redesign the Pell program to fit the needs of a twenty-first-century economy and student population.
To accomplish this, we propose three major structural reforms. First, we propose to augment the Pell program’s financial support 
with tailored guidance and support services that have been shown to improve academic and/or labor-market success, including 
separately tailored services for the distinctive circumstances of dependent and independent recipients. Second, we propose to 
dramatically simplify the eligibility and application process to ensure that the program reaches those who need it most, again 
tailoring the simplification to the distinctive circumstances of dependent and independent students. Finally, we propose several 
modifications to strengthen incentives for student effort and timely completion, without leading the program away from its core 
need-based (not merit-based) mission.
Taken together, the reforms that we propose would for the first time make Pell a true program, and not just a grant, thus 
inducing its beneficiaries to become full participants, and not just recipients. Although our proposed reforms are substantial, 
the existing structures for processing and delivering Pell Grants would continue to be relevant, and the goals of Pell supporters 
and beneficiaries would be furthered. Finally, while significant congressional action would be required in order to implement 
our proposal, these reforms would not substantially increase the cost of the program, and we believe they are structurally and 
politically feasible.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The Pell Grant program aims to make college possible for all who can benefit from postsecondary education; it has been the cornerstone of college financial aid since its 
inception in 1972 as the Basic Educational Opportunity Grant. 
The program’s voucher design—in which grant eligibility 
is assigned to the student, who can then use it at any one of 
thousands of accredited public or private institutions with few 
strings attached—reflects a distinctively American approach, 
appropriate for a diverse and decentralized system of higher 
education. In theory, this market-based approach allows 
students to use financial aid to select the institution appropriate 
for their needs and circumstances, thus allowing them to invest 
in their educations on the basis 
of their own reasonably well-
informed decisions. By giving 
students a relatively unrestricted 
aid voucher, the program helps 
overcome the problem of low-
income students underinvesting 
in higher education.
Over the forty years since this 
federal grant program was 
introduced for low- and moderate-
income students, it has expanded 
dramatically in both size and 
scope, and now serves a much 
more diverse set of individuals 
in a much more diverse mix of programs and institutions. 
Initially serving just a small fraction of undergraduates, the 
Pell program now serves over 9.4 million individuals at a cost of 
$35 billion annually, assisting more than one out of every three 
undergraduates enrolled.1
Furthermore, though originally conceived as a program 
primarily for recent high school graduates entering traditional 
four-year degree programs, the Pell program today also serves as 
the federal government’s primary workforce investment effort, 
increasing the role of Pell in serving independent students.2 
Overall, 60 percent of Pell Grant recipients are independent, 
with 44 percent of Pell recipients age twenty-five or older and 
roughly 25 percent age thirty or older. More than one in five Pell 
recipients are enrolled at for-profit institutions, and roughly half 
Over the forty years since this federal grant program 
was introduced for low- and moderate-income 
students, it has expanded dramatically in both size 
and scope, and now serves a much more diverse 
set of individuals in a much more diverse mix of 
programs and institutions.
are pursuing a sub-baccalaureate credential: either a certificate 
or an associate degree.
The stakes around program efficacy are also higher today 
than they were in 1972: a college credential is now essentially 
a prerequisite to earning a decent salary, with median income 
for full-time male workers with bachelor’s degrees (but not 
advanced degrees) about 84 percent higher than median income 
for male high school graduates, compared to a gap of 38 percent 
forty years ago. For women, the 60 percent difference forty years 
ago has grown to 106 percent today (U.S. Census Bureau 2012a, 
Tables P-16, P-17).
Finally, with Pell expenditures more than doubling over the 
past five years, critics are increasingly raising questions about 
whether the program’s results justify its cost. Unfortunately, 
credential completion rates for Pell recipients, measured six 
years after entry, are frustratingly low, as shown in table 1. Fewer 
than 50 percent of Pell recipients have completed any degree or 
credential six years after entry; this falls to 36 percent among 
students who first enrolled as independent students.3 About 30 
percent of dependent students and only 4 percent of independent 
students had earned bachelor’s degrees after six years. While 
these statistics are certainly worrisome, noncompletion is not 
a problem unique to Pell recipients, as seen in the bottom panel 
of the table.
Students who leave school without a credential may gain 
something from the coursework they do complete, even without 
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acquiring a degree. Indeed, for older students, leaving school 
before finishing a credential may be the result of improved 
labor-market opportunities as students are lured into the job 
market before finishing their degrees (Dadgar and Weiss 2012). 
Still, wage patterns suggest significant returns for completers, 
particularly bachelor’s degree recipients, compared to those 
with “some college, no degree” (U.S. Census Bureau 2012b, 
PINC-03).
Simply comparing completion rates among recipients, or 
completion rates between recipients and nonrecipients, cannot 
tell us the impact of the Pell program. Some students may 
enter college because of Pell who would not have otherwise; 
completion rates for Pell recipients, who are by definition 
financially disadvantaged, might be lower in the absence of 
this assistance. Simple economic theory would suggest that 
lowering the cost of college should increase both enrollment and 
persistence; indeed, the best evidence on other grant programs 
has found that an additional $1,000 of grant aid per student may 
increase college enrollment by 4 percentage points.4 
Currently, however, there is little definitive evidence that the 
Pell Grant program increases college enrollment among low-
income students, or that it is associated with higher persistence 
rates. While numerous studies have been conducted regarding 
the causal impact of Pell, the results have been relatively 
inconclusive. The broadest studies of the Pell Grant program, 
including an early study by Hansen (1983) and a more-rigorous 
subsequent study by Kane (1996), find no detectable effect of the 
introduction of Pell Grants on college enrollments for eligible 
(low-income) populations. A study by Seftor and Turner (2002) 
found that expansions of the Pell program during the late 
1980s increased college enrollments among older individuals 
(they could not examine persistence or completion). A study by 
Bettinger (2004) found some evidence that larger Pell awards 
were associated with higher persistence rates for younger 
students, but the results were sensitive to exactly how the effect 
was estimated.
Even if we did have convincing evidence of program impacts, 
it still might not be enough to defuse efforts to cut spending, 
considering the discouraging outcomes reported in table 1. Even 
if Pell Grants do have some positive impacts on enrollment and 
completion, there is clearly significant room for improvement. 
We would advocate strongly against efforts to cut the program; 
now is hardly the time to reduce our investments in education, 
as the United States falls behind other countries on measures 
of educational attainment and social mobility and leaps ahead 
on measures of inequality (Brandolini and Smeeding 2007; 
Economic Mobility Project 2011; Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development [OECD] 2012).
We propose reevaluating the structure of the program with an 
eye to making every dollar of funding work better. Ultimately, 
reforming the Pell program is more than just a matter of 
taxpayer accountability—it is a matter of better serving the 
students themselves and ensuring that students’ postsecondary 
experiences provide a stepping stone to a better life, and not just 
a temporary diversion. Reforms are needed that will effectively 
guide students to programs in which they are more likely to 
tAble 1. 
Degree Completion Outcomes Six Years after Entry, for Beginning Undergraduates by 
Dependency Status and Pell Grant Receipt (percent)
total dependent students Independent students
beginning pell recipients
Bachelor’s degree 19.5 30.1 4.2
Associate degree 9.4 9.7 8.9
Certificate 15.9 10.7 23.3
No credential 55.3 49.5 63.7
All beginning undergraduates
Bachelor’s degree 30.7 40.8 5.6
Associate degree 9.3 9.3 9.5
Certificate 9.4 6.0 18.0
No credential 50.5 43.9 66.9
Source: NCES 2009.
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succeed and that will lead quickly to stable employment and 
satisfactory earnings; this is particularly important for older 
students.
overvIeW of our proposed reforms
The time has come to comprehensively redesign the Pell 
program to fit the needs of a twenty-first-century economy and 
student population. It is also essential to move the conversation 
beyond just the maximum size of the Pell Grant: half of Pell 
Grant recipients already have their tuition and fees fully covered 
by Pell and other sources of grant aid. This statistic rises to 67 
percent at public four-year institutions and nearly 85 percent at 
public two-year institutions (NCES 2008).5 As research suggests 
and as we will argue below, we need more than just money to 
significantly improve program outcomes. As important as the 
financial subsidy is, handing students money and expecting 
them to steer their own courses through the maze of available 
options is an insufficient strategy for supporting their success. 
Given dramatic increases in both the diversity of the student 
population and the possible programs and institutions they may 
attend, students are in desperate need of timely guidance and 
support; it is essential that these additional services be tailored 
to the distinctive needs of both younger and older students. We 
propose three major structural reforms:
First, we propose to augment the Pell program’s financial 
support with tailored guidance and support services that have 
been shown to improve academic and/or labor-market success. 
Dependent students would receive light-touch, technology-
facilitated guidance from the point of submitting a financial aid 
application through initial enrollment and academic coaching 
services through the first year. Independent students would 
participate in one-on-one information and guidance sessions 
once per year, with the pre-enrollment counseling provided by 
a disinterested third party (e.g., through local One-Stop Career 
Centers [hereafter One-Stops] or other facilities funded and 
equipped to provide individual assessment and guidance about 
postsecondary options).
Second, we propose to dramatically simplify the eligibility 
and application process to ensure that the program reaches 
those who need it most, again tailoring the simplification to 
the distinctive circumstances of dependent and independent 
students. The program would determine eligibility once (as 
long as students remain continuously enrolled), eliminating 
the need for students to reapply each year; the program would 
automatically draw all financial data required from the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) through a system similar to the IRS data 
retrieval tool in current use. (Non-filers would submit a very 
simple form to document income and family size.)
Finally, we propose several modifications to strengthen 
incentives for student effort and timely completion, without 
leading the program away from its core need-based (not merit-
based) mission. These include limiting Pell disbursements to 
125 percent of the credit hours (hereafter credits) required for 
the program in which a student is enrolled; disbursing Pell 
according to credits attempted (so students could enroll year-
round or take more than twelve credits per term); and providing 
small bonuses for on-time completion of associate or bachelor’s 
degrees.
Some of our proposed reforms could be implemented 
independently and would constitute important steps on the 
road to increasing the equity and effectiveness of the Pell Grant 
program. Others require more thought, along with carefully 
designed experimentation and evaluation, to ensure optimal 
design. Together, the reforms would for the first time make Pell 
a program, and not just a grant, thus inducing its beneficiaries to 
become full participants, and not just recipients. Moreover, the 
program would be tailored to the different needs of older and 
younger students and would better achieve the array of goals 
Pell has grown to serve, including the promotion of general 
baccalaureate education as well as workforce development. 
Although the reforms we propose are substantial, the existing 
structures for processing and delivering Pell Grants would 
continue to be relevant, and, most important, the Pell recipients 
themselves would be closer to reaching their educational and 
career goals. Finally, while significant congressional action 
would be required to implement our proposed reforms, they 
need not substantially increase the cost of the program, and we 
believe they are structurally and politically feasible.
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Theory and evidence from economics and the behavioral sciences provide four key insights into problems in the current Pell program and guide our proposed reforms.
1. Individuals are not always able to make the best choices 
for themselves, especially in the face of complex financial 
decisions and in the absence of appropriate information.
2.  Program design should align with the needs and goals of the 
students it is intended to serve, including both independent 
and dependent students.
3. The complexity and bureaucracy of the Pell application 
process can impose significant barriers to participation, 
and can undermine program effectiveness by filtering out 
the very students in greatest need.
4.  Incentives matter for the decisions students make, so the Pell 
program should be carefully designed to generate incentives 
that align with program goals, including credential 
completion.
We next discuss each of these insights in detail.
1. Individuals are not always able to make the best choices 
for themselves, especially in the face of complex financial 
decisions and in the absence of appropriate information.
Classical economic theory implies that an abundance of choice 
can never be a bad thing, and, when it comes to educational 
choice, “[n]o nation in the world offers as much choice to 
potential undergraduates” as does the United States (Goldin 
and Katz 2008, 254). But determining which particular 
institution and program offers the best fit and best economic 
return can be overwhelming for a student. Indeed, recent work 
in psychology, marketing, and behavioral economics presents 
compelling evidence that there can be a “dark side of choice” 
that can lead to decision mistakes, procrastination, and regret 
(Botti and Iyengar 2006, 24). Moreover, the likelihood of error 
in decision making appears to increase when individuals have 
limited personal experience in the face of complex options 
(Beshears et al. 2008).
In the context of higher education, students’ choices are not 
always well informed. For example, qualitative evidence 
suggests that the marginal college students likely to attend 
community colleges and for-profit colleges often make their 
institutional selection haphazardly and fail to investigate 
more than one option (Rosenbaum, Deil-Amen, and Person 
2006). Students also make mistakes after enrollment, taking 
courses without understanding whether they meet program 
requirements (Goldrick-Rab 2010).
Studies have also found worrisome evidence of undermatching 
(in which high school students from low- and middle-income 
families often do not even apply to the most-selective institutions 
for which they academically qualify) and summer melt (in which 
high school seniors graduate on time, are accepted to college, 
apply for financial aid, and then fail to matriculate in the fall) 
(Avery and Turner 2009; Bowen, Chingos, and McPherson 2009; 
Hoxby and Avery 2012; Hoxby and Turner 2013; Roderick et 
al. 2009). This evidence has implications for degree completion 
because college selectivity is associated with graduation rates, 
time to degree, and post-college earnings, even after controlling 
for incoming student characteristics (Bound, Lovenheim, and 
Turner 2010; Bowen et al. 2009; Thomas and Zhang 2005).
Moreover, as increasing amounts of information about 
individual institutions and programs become available online, 
it is becoming clear that students need more than just better 
information: they need guidance in choosing appropriate paths 
given their goals, academic preparation, and circumstances. 
But many institutions, particularly public institutions, are 
insufficiently staffed to provide such support, with student-to-
counselor ratios as high as 1,500 to 1 (Bettinger, Boatman, and 
Long 2013).
Evidence is mounting that simple, low-to-modest-cost coaching 
interventions that reach out to students during the summer after 
high school and throughout the first year of college can have 
substantial effects on enrollment and persistence. For example, 
in a series of randomized experiments, Castleman, Page, and 
Schooley (2013) found that text messaging, peer mentoring, and 
proactive outreach were all successful at reducing summer melt, 
with costs of no more than $200 per student served.6 
A randomized study of a student coaching service provided 
by InsideTrack (a for-profit company that contracts with 
individual institutions) found significant impacts on persistence 
for a cost of approximately $500 per student per semester 
(Bettinger and Baker 2011). For example, InsideTrack’s coaches 
Chapter 2: The Rationale for Reform: Lessons from 
Theory and Evidence
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contacted their students via phone, email, text message, and 
social media to engage them in conversations about how to 
“prioritize their studies, plan how they can be successful, and 
identify and overcome barriers to students’ academic success. 
…[T]he coaches focus significant time assessing the student’s 
life outside of school” (Bettinger and Baker 2011, 2).
In addition to their modest cost, because these interventions 
are largely based on phone calls and/or text messages rather 
than relying on in-person meetings with a counselor, they are 
more accessible for students and potentially easier to scale up. 
Even the pricier interventions reviewed here are significantly 
cheaper than more-intensive programs with similar goals, such 
as Upward Bound, which has an estimated cost of $4,700 per 
participant (Bos et al. 2012).
For independent students, the challenges are distinctive. The 
pressure to identify a specific postsecondary program—not just 
an institution—is greater, as older 
students are more likely to pursue 
specific occupational credentials. 
Young students have the luxury 
of time to explore different paths, 
but older students have limited 
time and flexibility because they 
might already be in the labor 
force, and/or might have families 
of their own.
The choice of programs of study 
is of particular importance for 
students seeking specific occupational education (Carnevale, 
Smith, et al. 2011). Over 40 percent of workers with some 
college but no degree earn more than the median earnings 
of those with an associate degree, in part because of large 
variation in earnings by field of study, not just level of 
attainment (Carnevale, Rose, and Cheah 2011). For example, 
individuals earning associate degrees in high-return fields 
earn about 50 percent more than those with associate degrees 
in low-return fields (Jacobson 2011).
Workforce development programs are most successful when 
they are closely connected to local labor-market needs and 
when participants receive not only money, but also guidance 
about their choices and support for managing the combination 
of their responsibilities. Combining funding for training with 
intensive occupational counseling assistance and job search has 
been shown to be cost-effective (Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske 
2009; Insight 2010; Roder and Elliott 2011). For older, displaced 
workers in particular, the returns to community college 
attendance can be considerable when they pursue courses of 
study that prepare them for employment in high-demand fields 
(Insight 2010; Jacobson 2011; Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 
2003).
The current Pell Grant program does not in any way encourage 
or facilitate the development of effective courses of study or help 
guide students into the programs from which they are likely 
to benefit most. Pell Grants should not and cannot be used to 
fix every problem in higher education, but we believe that the 
program can leverage its reach to do more.
2. Program design should align with the needs and goals of 
the students it is intended to serve, including independent 
and dependent students.
The goal of the Pell program broadly stated is to improve 
educational attainment. But the specific economic rationale for 
subsidizing recent high school graduates, for whom the program 
was originally designed, differs in subtle but important ways 
from the rationale for subsidizing the older individuals who 
now make up a large fraction of recipients. The primary goal 
of the Pell program for younger students is to promote access 
and opportunity for students from disadvantaged families, 
diminishing the gap between them and those who grew up 
in more-privileged circumstances. Both equity and efficiency 
considerations dictate diminishing the financial barriers these 
young people face in continuing their education beyond high 
school. The economic rationale for a public subsidy for older 
students has less to do with equalizing opportunity and more 
to do with providing a type of social insurance—a means for 
individuals who have had limited success in the labor market 
for whatever reason to improve their skills and reenter the 
workforce, hopefully as quickly as possible, and in a stronger 
position.
The Pell Grant program serves as an integral component 
of the social safety net, providing individuals who have not 
completed bachelor’s degrees with the opportunity to gain the 
education and training they need to succeed in the workforce. 
Adult students have more compelling reasons to complete their 
programs quickly and to see immediate returns in the form of 
well-paying jobs. For older students with personal and family 
responsibilities, time is limited and goals tend to be more 
specific. Many younger students, on the other hand, are likely to 
benefit from a broad education that provides opportunities for 
Pell Grants should not and cannot be used to fix 
every problem in higher education, but we believe 
that the program can leverage its reach to do more.
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exploration and changes of course, accumulating experiences 
and building a variety of personal qualities along the way.
Recent high school graduates face different economic 
opportunities and constraints from those faced by thirty-
year-olds with families and previous job experience; students’ 
observed educational choices and outcomes reflect these 
different circumstances.7 As table 2 indicates, half of all 
dependent undergraduates (46 percent of dependent Pell 
recipients) who began their studies in 2003–04 enrolled in 
bachelor’s degree programs. However, only 10 percent of 
independent undergraduates took this path.8 Older students 
in associate degree programs are more likely than younger 
students to be pursuing occupational or technical degrees.9
Despite the obvious differences between these two broad 
types of students, the only way the current Pell program 
distinguishes between the groups is in terms of whose income 
the U.S. Department of Education (ED) considers in the aid 
eligibility calculation. Conversations around Pell reform have 
not consistently engaged the Department of Labor or workforce 
development experts; many taxpayers and perhaps even some 
policymakers may fail to realize the extent to which Pell Grants 
serve a workforce development role. In 2011, federal spending 
on employment and training was $9 billion compared to $17 
billion in Pell Grant funds provided to adults over the age of 
twenty-four (Office of Management and Budget [OMB] 2012, 
Table 3.2; ED 2012). Some Pell advocates have argued that it 
is better not to draw any program distinctions between older 
and younger students out of concern that programs for older 
students elicit less political support than those for younger 
students. While we acknowledge this concern, we argue that a 
one-size-fits-all program cannot maximize success for either 
group; in fact, older students may have the most to gain if a 
greater awareness of Pell’s essential workforce development goal 
helps stimulate new ideas on how to better serve those students 
through the program.
The distinction between dependent and independent students 
already exists in the system for determining eligibility for Pell 
Grants, with all students aged twenty-four and older considered 
independent. Note that while students aged twenty-three and 
younger can be classified as independent, age is the primary 
determinant of independent status in practice. The average age 
of an independent Pell recipient is thirty, and the average age of 
a dependent Pell recipient is twenty.10 
3. The complexity and bureaucracy of the Pell application 
process can impose significant barriers to participation, and 
can undermine program effectiveness by filtering out the 
students in greatest need.
The Pell program’s burdensome eligibility and application 
process urgently needs reform. The current system requires all 
students to provide considerable detail about their and their 
families’ financial circumstances on the Free Application for 
Federal Student Aid (FAFSA). A complex formula (the Federal 
Methodology) then determines their Pell Grant eligibility. 
This complexity makes it difficult for students and families to 
determine in advance how much assistance they can expect.
There is near consensus among researchers and policymakers 
that the current complexity creates a barrier to student access 
(Baum et al. 2013; Bettinger et al. 2012; Dynarski and Scott-
Clayton 2006, 2007; Rethinking Student Aid Study Group 
2008). A recent experimental study by Bettinger and colleagues 
(2012) provides dramatic supporting evidence. In the 
experiment, low-income families who visited a tax-preparation 
center were randomly assigned to one of three groups: a full 
tAble 2. 
Enrollment in Degree and Certificate Programs by Dependency Status at First Enrollment, 
Beginning Undergraduate Students, 2003–04 (percent)







pell grant recipients     
Dependent 3.1 14.0 37.3 45.6
Independent 5.8 36.8 47.1 10.3
All undergraduates     
Dependent 7.1 5.8 36.6 50.5
Independent 12.0 25.0 52.8 10.3
Source: NCES 2009; Quick Stats analysis by authors.
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treatment group who received both personalized information 
about eligibility for financial aid and personal assistance with 
completing and submitting the FAFSA; an information-only 
group that received personalized information about financial 
aid eligibility but no application assistance; and a control group 
that received a brochure with general information about college 
costs, financial aid, and the value of going to college.
The full treatment cost less than $100 per participant; this 
treatment increased immediate college entry rates by 8 
percentage points (a 24 percent increase) for high school seniors 
and 1.5 percentage points (a 16 percent increase) for independent 
participants with no prior college experience. After three years, 
participants in the full treatment group had accumulated 
significantly more time in college than the control group. 
Impacts on actual financial aid receipt were even larger.
While the ED has made progress in recent years in reducing the 
number of questions on the FAFSA and enabling some students 
to automatically import tax information from the IRS, these 
improvements have had an arguably limited impact on the 
application experience overall. In particular, they do not allow 
students to predict aid amounts in advance. Moreover, there has 
been no concerted effort to reevaluate the logic of need analysis 
for older individuals paying for their own schooling.
Our proposal incorporates a streamlined eligibility and 
application process that is tailored to the circumstances 
of dependent and independent students. For both groups, 
eligibility would be based on a limited number of data elements 
measured over three years prior to beginning a program, and 
ensuring a sufficient amount of time to complete the application 
process well in advance of enrollment. This eligibility would 
then be fixed for a specified period, eliminating the need for 
annual reapplication. For dependent students, award size would 
be determined using a simple look-up table based on income 
and family size. For independent students, award determination 
would be even simpler.
4. Incentives matter for the decisions students make, so 
the Pell program should be carefully designed to generate 
incentives that align with program goals, including credential 
completion.
The Pell Grant program was designed with the assumption 
that giving money to students from low-income families 
would overcome the main hurdle they faced in meeting their 
educational goals. There was more concern about whether they 
could afford to enroll than about whether students were prepared 
to complete the programs they started. While eventual degree 
completion rates have hovered around 50 percent for decades, 
time to completion has increased substantially. Fewer than 40 
percent of bachelor’s degree recipients finish their degrees by 
age twenty-two, compared with more than 60 percent in the 
1970s (Turner 2004, based on analysis of Current Population 
Survey data). Similarly, among those who earn so-called two-
year degrees today, more than half take more than two years 
to do so.11
Research suggests that linking financial aid renewal to 
specific GPA or credit-completion requirements may improve 
persistence and completion relative to grants with no strings 
attached (Patel and Richburg-Hayes 2012; Richburg-Hayes et 
al. 2009; Scott-Clayton 2011; for a review, see Dynarski and 
Scott-Clayton 2013). As just one example, Scott-Clayton’s 
(2011) study of West Virginia’s PROMISE scholarship—that 
at the time provided free tuition and fees for up to four years 
to academically eligible students as long as they maintained a 
minimum GPA and completed at least thirty credits per year—
found that five-year bachelor’s degree completion rates rose by 
4 percentage points (an 8 percent increase relative to baseline) 
and on-time graduation rates rose by 7 percentage points (more 
than a 25 percent improvement). Tellingly, the scholarship 
significantly increased annual GPAs and credits completed in 
each of the first three years of college, but in the fourth and final 
year of scholarship receipt, while students were still receiving 
the money but no longer faced the achievement incentives, the 
program’s effect on student behavior nearly disappeared.
These findings do not support turning Pell into a merit-based 
program like the West Virginia PROMISE scholarship. In fact, 
the success of some merit-based programs relies in part on the 
existence of a wholly need-based program like Pell that serves as 
the foundation of financial support. The fundamental mission 
of Pell Grants has been and should remain to provide financial 
access to higher education for disadvantaged students, not to 
reward achievement.
Nevertheless, the Pell Grant program should not—and cannot—
avoid incorporating incentives in its design and these incentives 
should be structured to align with program goals. The current 
design actually provides disincentives for timely completion by 
providing more assistance for the same number of credits to 
students who take longer to finish, essentially penalizing those 
who would prefer to finish faster. This occurs because students 
are considered full-time, qualifying for a full Pell Grant, if they 
enroll for at least twelve credits a semester. Those who enroll 
for fifteen credits—the average number necessary to complete 
an associate degree in two years or a bachelor’s degree in four 
years—do not receive additional funding. A student who takes 
an average of twelve credits a semester over five years of full-
time study to complete 120 credits receives five full Pell Grants. 
A similar student who graduates in four years by taking fifteen 
credits per semester receives only four full Pell Grants.
It is also worth noting that Pell Grants already require students 
to meet basic satisfactory academic progress (SAP) requirements 
in order to continue receiving aid. While institutions have some 
flexibility in how they define these requirements, they typically 
involve maintaining a C average (2.0 GPA) and completing 
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a certain proportion of credits attempted (e.g., 75 percent). 
In theory, then, at least minimal achievement incentives are 
embodied in current program rules. In practice, however, it is 
unclear the extent to which these rules are binding, particularly 
because they do not follow students who transfer across 
institutions, which more than a third of Pell Grant recipients 
will do.
Our proposal will strengthen existing SAP requirements to 
follow students across institutions, but our primary reform 
to enhance completion incentives is simply to allow Pell to be 
disbursed according to students’ actual course loads, so that 
students who want to finish faster by taking fifteen credits 
per term and/or enrolling in the summer can do so without 
lowering their total Pell benefit. This approach would eliminate 
the concept of the annual maximum Pell Grant, currently the 
main focus of many policy discussions, and would instead 
award grant aid according to the enrollment patterns of 
individual students.
We also propose stricter limitations on the total number of 
credits covered for programs of a given length, and give students 
a bonus for completing their programs on time, so that students 
share in the savings. With 37 percent of undergraduates 
currently receiving Pell Grants, we expect these incentives not 
only to influence student behavior, but also to place pressure on 
institutions to provide the courses and the advising that students 
need to finish on time (College Board 2012b, Fig. 14a). There is 
no doubt that both student and institutional behaviors must be 
modified to improve the outcomes of Pell Grant students.
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We propose to augment the financial component of the Pell Grant program with guidance and support services that are specifically tailored for both 
categories of students: dependent and independent. We also 
propose additional tailored simplifications of the eligibility 
and application process. Finally, we propose strengthening 
incentives for student effort and completion for all Pell 
participants. An overview of the major design elements is 
provided in table 3.
Chapter 3: Our Proposal: An Augmented Pell 
Designed to Maximize Student Success
tAble 3.
Overview of Proposed Pell Reform
current policy proposed reform for  
dependent students




•	 None. •	 Summer through first-year 
academic coaching service 
(initiated on a pilot basis; 
expanded if randomized 
evaluation suggests it is cost-
effective).
•	 Career counseling requirements for 
students (before and during enrollment) 
and for institutions, with pre-enrollment 
counseling provided by a disinterested third 
party (initiated on a pilot basis; expanded if 
randomized evaluation suggests it is cost-
effective). Less-intensive personal guidance 
services provided by the institution at least 
once a year until program completion.
•	 Improved connection to income support 
programs to cover student and family living 
costs during enrollment periods.
eligibility and 
application
•	 Maximum award of $5,645 for 
2013–14 based on complex 
need analysis with six separate 
formulas for three distinct groups 
of students. 
•	 Requires filing a FAFSA with 
prior year’s tax information as 
well as additional information on 
nontaxable income and assets. 
•	 Renewal application required 
every year.
•	 Simple look-up table based on 
family size and average family 
income over prior 3 years.
•	 Eligibility automatically and 
universally determined for tax 
filers in year dependent turns 17 
(or earlier if requested). 
•	 Eligibility fixed at age 17 unless 
or until a student becomes 
independent.
•	 No detailed need analysis. Eligibility for full 
awards based on 3 years of prior household 
income; half-size awards for marginally 
eligible group. 
•	 Eligibility automatically determined using IRS 
data upon request. Also covering dislocated 
workers (e.g., those with 3 years of job 
tenure). 
•	 Financial eligibility fixed for specified 




•	 Maximum awards pegged to 
enrollment in 24 credits per year; 
students cannot receive funds in 
excess of the maximum award to 
complete degree faster.
•	 Students may receive 6 maximum 
awards over their lifetimes, 
regardless of program length.
•	 SAP requirements are unevenly 
enforced.
•	 Disbursement based on credits enrolled up to 45 credits per year. 
•	 Aid limited to 125 percent of credits required for credential, for a maximum of 150 
credits.
•	 SAP determinations will track students across institutions.
•	 Students who complete an associate degree within 2 calendar years of entry will 
receive a $250 completion bonus; those who complete a bachelor’s degree within 
4 years will receive a $500 completion bonus.
14  redesigning the Pell Grant Program for the Twenty-First century
component 1: tAIlored guIdAnce And support 
servIces
A portion of the funding for the Pell Grant program should 
be used to fund guidance and support services for Pell Grant 
recipients. All students need better information and guidance 
about the educational programs and institutions in which they 
have a reasonable chance of succeeding, about the employment 
and graduate study options likely to be available when they 
complete their initial studies, and about the costs they will 
incur, which for many will involve accumulating student 
debt. Independent students, most of whom have work and/or 
family responsibilities, face different barriers to success from 
the barriers faced by most recent high school graduates, who 
are likely to be dependent students. The guidance and supports 
built into the Pell program should thus be distinctive.
Because of these differences, we propose a structured support 
system to accompany the Pell Grant funding for both groups 
of recipients. These structures must be well-designed and 
adequately funded to ensure that they improve student outcomes 
rather than adding ineffective mandates and bureaucratic 
hurdles. We suggest that an investment on the order of 5–10 
percent of current Pell funding ($2 billion–$4 billion) could 
support meaningful and effective additional services for new 
recipients. We outline options next, but recommend that the 
federal government support the evaluation of test programs and 
sites before implementing detailed program provisions.
Dependent Pell Grant recipients should be provided with 
a basic college coaching service from the time of initial 
application through the first year of enrollment.
As discussed above in Chapter 2, several studies using rigorous 
random assignment designs have found that relatively low-cost 
coaching services, ranging from $200 to $1,000 per student, can 
have substantial impacts on the actual enrollment of students 
who apply to college, as well as on their persistence through 
the first year. Prior to enrollment, coaching services may 
help students interpret aid award letters and prioritize tasks 
and paperwork required to complete the enrollment process. 
After enrollment, coaching services may help identify barriers 
to persistence and provide students with links to relevant, 
institution-specific resources.
While several of the interventions that have shown success have 
involved at least one in-person meeting, all took advantage of 
text messaging, email, and phone calls in order to communicate 
with students. At a bare minimum, the ED could use the phone 
numbers and email addresses provided on the simplified Pell 
application form to send automatic messages with timely 
information and links to additional sources of support. The 
simplified Pell form could include an opt-out box for individuals 
who decline these communications.
Since eligibility would be determined automatically at age 
seventeen and fixed until age twenty-four, the ED could 
proactively reach out by mail to individuals who do not enroll 
initially to remind them of their eligibility, much as the Social 
Security Administration periodically mails estimates of Social 
Security eligibility. This would likely require collaboration 
between the ED and the Department of the Treasury, which 
would have the needed information on eligibility and address. 
These mailings would add additional costs, but even $10 per 
mailing to 10 million households per year would be a trivial 
fraction of overall Pell spending ($34.5 billion in 2011–12).
Services that are more sophisticated and personalized could be 
contracted out by the ED. A number of private organizations, 
both nonprofit and for-profit, have emerged nationwide to 
provide similar services either directly to students or through 
contracts with institutions.12 While personalized services 
would be more expensive, existing research suggests the impact 
may justify the cost, and may exceed the impact of additional 
increases in financial aid, on a per dollar basis. For example, the 
Bettinger and Baker (2011) study of InsideTrack’s service found 
that it increased persistence over the first year of enrollment by 
5 percentage points (at a cost of $1,000 each for students who 
participated for two semesters), a larger effect on persistence 
than has been found for need-based aid (see Dynarski and 
Scott-Clayton 2013 for a review of financial aid research).
At this point, the precise format and intensity of the coaching 
service should be subject to discussion, and we think it is crucial 
that whatever service is ultimately proposed should be subjected 
to a randomized evaluation prior to a full-scale rollout. But 
we want to emphasize that the evidence strongly suggests the 
impact of additional guidance may be greater at this point than 
the impact of further increases in the generosity of Pell. Even 
if no additional funding was made available, it may be cost-
effective to redirect a small portion of Pell funds—perhaps 5 
to 10 percent—from student grants to specific evidence-based 
student support services.
Independent Pell Grant recipients should be required to 
meet with a third-party career counselor before enrolling in 
a program. These counselors would be made available via 
One-Stops or other structures designed to facilitate linkage 
between postsecondary education and local workforce needs.
These services should be designed to help students formulate 
their goals and make informed choices about programs most 
likely to lead them to those goals. All independent Pell recipients 
should have access to some level of continued, personalized 
guidance throughout their studies.
While evaluations of the effectiveness of existing structures 
created under the Workforce Investment Act vary, the associated 
One-Stops could form the basis for the counseling that adult 
students entering postsecondary study require. Services would 
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have to be tailored more toward assessment of appropriate 
education and training and less toward immediate job placement 
than is now the case.13 Counseling must be based on up-to-date 
information on job availability and earnings potential at the 
local level, as well as on what kinds of education and training 
are needed to achieve competency in particular occupations and 
assessment of whether individual students are likely to be able 
and willing to attain such education and training.
It is critical that these services be provided conveniently and 
efficiently, independent of the institutions offering the relevant 
programs of study. Funding these Centers (or similar facilities) 
to assess and counsel independent Pell Grant recipients could 
significantly improve postsecondary success rates, more than 
recouping the cost.
An earlier Hamilton Project discussion paper by Jacobson 
(2009) describes the critical role that One-Stops can play and 
outlines several reforms—including more-accurately measuring 
the costs and benefits of training, staff-intensive counseling, job 
placement through public labor exchanges, and other forms of 
low-cost job search assistance—that would help ensure their 
effectiveness. Strong (2013) proposes shifting One-Stops from 
their current focus on job matching to helping individuals 
develop the competencies and credentials necessary for landing 
and succeeding in jobs that have career potential. Steigleder and 
Soares (2012) propose restructuring the workforce development 
system to increase the postsecondary training provided. 
Workers would enroll in education and training programs based 
on assessment of their skills and their need for support services.
Developing the optimal design for these counseling services 
will require careful experimentation and evaluation of 
alternative models. There is a growing body of research on the 
effectiveness of occupational training programs and support 
services, and a number of researchers and organizations have 
proposed innovative programs for improving the success rates 
of adults seeking to improve their marketable skills (Edelman 
et al. 2011; Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 2011; Soares 2010; 
Strong 2013). This evidence should provide the basis for both 
the initial basic design of the program for independent students 
and for pilot programs around the country to develop effective 
local strategies.
The counseling provided to independent students should not 
end when they choose their course of study. The enrollment 
patterns of independent students, who frequently attend part-
time and have breaks in their studies, make continuing formal 
guidance throughout the period of their studies critical. Our 
proposal would mandate that Pell recipients meet with a 
guidance counselor, career counselor, or other designated 
student-success advocates at their institutions at least once 
annually while they are enrolled. These services should be an 
integral part of institutional programs and should not require 
additional federal funding.
The federal government should encourage and/or provide 
incentives for states to allow students to use income support 
programs to improve their chances of succeeding in college. 
It should also review its own income support programs to 
ensure that they do not discourage recipients from acquiring 
the necessary education and training.
The Pell Grant program is not and cannot feasibly be generous 
enough to cover the living costs of adult students and their 
families. Too often, income support programs (e.g., the Earned 
Income Tax Credit, Medicaid, the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program, Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families), with rules and regulations generally set at the state 
level, exclude students. In an attempt to encourage immediate 
self-sufficiency, many programs have strict limits on the extent 
to which postsecondary enrollment can substitute for work 
as an eligibility criterion. This shortsighted approach makes 
earning valuable labor-market credentials much more difficult 
for many who could benefit from these programs.
Barr and Turner (2012) provide evidence of the importance of 
supplementary income support for postsecondary students. 
They find that states in which unemployment compensation 
regulations favor postsecondary access for displaced workers, 
as well as states with longer benefit duration, saw significantly 
larger enrollment increases during the 2007–09 recession.
The Benefits Access for Completion program, funded by several 
foundations and administered by the Center for Law and Social 
Policy and the American Association of Community Colleges, 
is currently developing systems at several community colleges to 
improve student access to income support programs. A similar 
effort by Single Stop USA and the Association of Community 
College Trustees shows promising results (Goldrick-Rab, 
Broton, and Gates 2013). Results of these programs and 
findings from other rigorous experiments should provide the 
basis for designing federal strategies to ensure greater access 
to the funding that independent Pell Grant recipients need to 
supplement their student aid.
component 2: tAIlored sImplIfIcAtIon of 
elIgIbIlIty And ApplIcAtIon
The proposed reforms to the Pell Grant system will simplify the 
application and eligibility processes, allowing easier access to a 
more predictable Pell Grant system.
Pell eligibility should be determined once, and should rely on 
data from the IRS, eliminating both the complex application 
form and the need to reapply multiple times over a course of 
study.
When young people reach the age of seventeen, the Pell program 
would automatically calculate their Pell Grant eligibility based 
on their parents’ tax returns for the prior three years.14 As 
suggested in Dynarski and Scott-Clayton’s (2007) simplification 
proposal, set forth in a Hamilton Project discussion paper, this 
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automatic calculation and notification could be authorized by 
including a check-off box on income tax return forms that would 
give the IRS permission to forward the relevant tax information 
to the ED. This would enable families to be informed of Pell 
Grant eligibility approximately a year before students graduate 
from high school.
Those not required to file taxes would provide simple income 
information to the ED on a one-page form to show eligibility. 
When students are ready to apply to a postsecondary institution, 
they would complete a simple one-page Pell Grant claim form to 
trigger the award that has already been automatically calculated.
The Pell eligibility set at age seventeen would be valid until the 
student automatically becomes an independent student at the age 
of twenty-four. An appeals process would allow the program to 
adjust awards based on unusual changes in family circumstances. 
Young independents under the current system—those who are 
twenty-three or younger but classified as independent, most 
commonly because they have children or are married—would 
under our proposal automatically retain any eligibility they 
would have as dependent students until age twenty-four, but 
could choose to apply instead as independent students.15
Students enrolling at age twenty-four or older would submit a 
brief application allowing the IRS to forward data to determine 
eligibility. Students would be eligible if their average income 
over the past three years was lower than an amount set in 
relation to the poverty level. If eligible, they would receive 
adequate funding to complete their degrees for five years or 
until they left school and/or completed the program in which 
they enrolled, whichever comes first.
Fixing eligibility for multiple years greatly reduces the financial 
uncertainty students face when beginning a postsecondary 
program. It also eliminates the problem of many students 
simply failing to reapply for aid each year.
Pell awards for most dependent students should be based on 
two data elements that are available from the IRS: (1) parents’ 
adjusted gross income and (2) family size. The Pell program 
would use those data to create a simple look-up table.
In order to make it easier for families and individuals to 
determine their aid eligibility far in advance of need, award sizes 
should be based on a simple formula, with look-up tables based 
on income and family size widely available. For most students, 
Pell awards should be based only on adjusted gross income 
and family size, as measured by number of federal income tax 
exemptions. For students whose tax forms indicate that their 
low adjusted gross income may not be representative of their 
true financial capacity, the ED may require more information 
or students could be deemed ineligible.
In addition to allowing the Pell program to adjust eligibility 
for families whose low reported incomes are not representative 
of their actual financial circumstances, the more-detailed 
financial information available from the IRS would allow the 
program to automatically calculate aid eligibility indices. These 
indices could then be used by states and institutions to award 
grant aid to students whose incomes are too high to qualify for 
the Pell program.
The Pell program would base eligibility for dependent students 
only on parents’ financial circumstances. Neither students’ 
income and assets nor the timing of siblings’ enrollment in 
college would affect the amount of aid awarded.
The system could take advantage of IRS data by basing eligibility 
on three years of income data rather than on just one year. 
Using average income over a three-year period serves several 
purposes: First, incomes can fluctuate arbitrarily from year to 
year, so a multiyear average provides a more-reliable estimate of 
a household’s financial strength. Second, it limits the scope for 
gaming. The incentive to shift income from one year to another 
will be minimized, and it may be more difficult for applicants to 
shift income completely out of the three-year window. Finally, 
while an even longer window may be theoretically preferable 
in terms of accurately capturing long-term financial strength, 
a three-year window acknowledges the relevance of the recent 
past and could be implemented using IRS records.
The professional judgment system should remain in place for 
dependent students whose parents’ financial circumstances 
have deteriorated significantly since the time the award level 
was determined and for those whose parents are unavailable. 
Orphans, foster children, and those who are wards of the court 
would automatically be eligible for the maximum grant. This 
would also be the case for students whose parents receive means-
tested benefits from programs such as Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families, Medicaid, Section 8 public housing benefits, or 
Supplemental Security Income.
Pell awards for independent students should be a flat amount 
for those who qualify based on past income or displaced 
worker status, and should allow smaller awards for those who 
just miss the cut-off.
For independent students, Pell award determination can be 
made even simpler, with only two levels of awards: full awards 
for students with household income up to, for example, 200 
percent of the poverty line, and half awards for students with 
incomes between 200 percent and 250 percent of the poverty 
line. Attempting to make finer distinctions among these aid 
applicants is both unnecessary—currently about 80 percent of 
independent students with dependents and about 60 percent 
of those without dependents are eligible for the maximum Pell 
Grant—and problematic (ED 2012). To the extent that income 
of independent students varies, it is difficult to separate those 
who have the capacity for only low earnings from those who 
have low earnings simply because they are choosing to work less 
while continuing to pursue their education.
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Professional judgment could also be used to extend eligibility 
to additional groups of independent students. For example, 
individuals who qualify as dislocated workers according to 
standardized criteria and who have at least three years of job 
tenure could qualify for an award even if their average income 
exceeds the threshold.
The Pell program should communicate annually with families 
and individuals about their potential Pell Grant eligibility 
and about other resources available to help pay for college.
Families of middle school and high school students—
and possibly elementary school students—should receive 
notification from the federal government about the Pell Grants 
for which students would be eligible if they were of college age. 
Logistically, either the IRS could send this notification as part 
of the tax system, or it could provide the ED with Pell eligibility 
information for individuals, but not with tax data. The 
technical and privacy issues involved should be manageable, as 
has turned out to be the case with the new system of allowing 
federal financial aid applicants to pre-fill their FAFSA forms 
with IRS data. Older individuals with persistently low earnings 
may similarly benefit from increased awareness. Because 
eligibility is based on information the IRS already has, those 
who are flagged as eligible could be proactively notified (either 
directly or via modules in tax preparation software) rather than 
only after they make an inquiry.
There is considerable evidence that early awareness of funding 
available to pay for college can have a positive impact on 
academic preparation and planning for college (Destin and 
Oysterman 2009; Elliott et al. 2011). Children growing up in 
low-income families who think they will not be able to pay 
for college may disengage from high school and fail to take 
steps, such as taking the ACT or SAT, that may be required for 
college application. Knowing well in advance about federal aid 
eligibility should help mitigate this situation.
Initial award levels should be set to be approximately cost-
neutral for both dependent and independent students, and 
growth in award levels should be linked to changes in the 
consumer price index (CPI).
Simplifying the Pell eligibility formula need not affect overall 
program costs, though simplification necessarily means some 
students will get more and some students will get less (Dynarski 
and Scott-Clayton 2006, 2007). We propose setting award levels 
under the new simplified formula to leave both the overall 
cost of the program and the division of the funding between 
dependent and independent students as they would be under 
the current system.
Linking award levels to the CPI by, for example, legislating that 
they will increase by CPI +1 percent each year would eliminate 
the uncertainty and political gamesmanship that characterize 
the current annual appropriations process.
component 3: enhAncIng completIon 
IncentIves
Reducing the complexity of the Pell Grant program is only the 
first step in making these subsidies more effective for students. 
The program must be designed to support student success.
The prorating of Pell Grants for students attending less than 
full-time should be extended so that students attending 
more than full-time receive larger grants, covering up to a 
maximum of forty-five credits each calendar year, allowing 
students to progress at their own pace and to be funded for 
more than two full-time terms over an academic year.
We propose Pell Grants that for all recipients would be based 
on the number of credits attempted.16 This is currently the case 
for students attending less than full-time (fewer than twelve 
credits), but not for students attending more than full-time 
(more than twelve credits).
The Pell Grant program is not currently structured to maximize 
incentives and support for students to progress through their 
postsecondary programs in a timely manner. Current funding 
levels depend on whether students are enrolled less than half-
time (fewer than six credits), half-time (six to eight credits), 
three-quarters-time (nine to eleven credits), or full-time (twelve 
or more credits). However, this system does not encourage 
students to enroll with the intensity required to complete a 
bachelor’s degree in four years or an associate degree in two 
years. Timely completion requires an average of fifteen credits 
per semester. A system that funds students according to the 
number of credits for which they are enrolled would provide 
additional dollars to students whose schedules are designed 
with this goal in mind. This system would also be much simpler 
than the current set of categories. Moreover, it would allow 
students to be funded year-round if they enroll for all available 
terms of study. In contrast, the current system funds only two 
full-time terms per year.
Our system would reinstate the benefits of the short-lived 
summer Pell—which was introduced in 2009 and then 
discontinued in 2011 due to federal budget constraints and 
the concern that students were “overloading” on courses and 
ballooning program costs—with several additional protections 
against overuse. First, as described next, lifetime Pell awards will 
be capped at a fixed number of credits so students who accelerate 
will have fewer credits available in future years, meaning there 
is no incentive for institutions to simply inflate credits or for 
students to take more credits than are necessary for the degree. 
Second, we propose below strengthening the SAP requirements 
so that students will have incentives to not attempt more credits 
than they think they can successfully complete.
Note that this system would eliminate the concept of a fixed 
maximum Pell Grant that has been the focus of most discussion 
of Pell funding to date. Students who enroll in 2013–14 can 
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receive no more than $5,645 for the year, even if they enroll 
for more than twelve credits per semester. Under the proposed 
system, the award level per credit would be fixed, but students 
could receive that amount for up to forty-five credits per year.
Students would be eligible for Pell Grants to cover up to 125 
percent of the credits required for their degree or credential, 
up to a lifetime maximum of 150 credits. Students enrolled 
in sub-baccalaureate programs could stack such credentials, 
but would have to complete at least one credential in order 
to receive funding for more than seventy-five credits in these 
programs.
Some students are required to complete developmental courses 
or prerequisites that do not count toward their degrees; in 
addition, there must be some allowance for students not 
completing all attempted credits. However, funding limits 
tailored to the length of the program will provide the structure 
students need to progress in a timely manner and prevent 
students from exhausting their lifetime Pell eligibility pursuing 
a single short-term credential.
Our proposal would mean that students in a thirty-credit 
certificate program would be eligible for thirty-eight credits 
of Pell funding. If students wanted to stack certificates by 
subsequently enrolling in a second thirty-credit certificate 
program, they would get another thirty-eight credits of 
eligibility. A student who completed a certificate and then 
enrolled in a sixty-credit associate degree program would be 
eligible for an additional seventy-five credits of assistance. If the 
same student then transferred to a bachelor’s degree program, 
she would be eligible for additional Pell funds up to the lifetime 
maximum of 150 credits. We would place one restriction to 
ensure that students do not switch programs repeatedly just 
to activate additional eligibility: students who are not enrolled 
in a bachelor’s degree program would have to complete at least 
one credential (certificate or associate degree) within the first 
seventy-five credits funded in order to receive additional funds.
Lifetime Pell eligibility, covering any combination of degrees 
and certificates, would be capped at 150 credits. This is a change 
from current rules, which are an incoherent mix of flexibility 
and restriction. Current rules allow students to attend full-
time for up to twelve semesters as long as they never complete 
a bachelor’s degree. Those pursuing a certificate are allowed the 
same amount of time as those pursuing a bachelor’s degree. On 
the other hand, students who would like to take a heavier load 
in order to complete their degrees on time do not receive any 
additional funding compared to those who take only twelve 
credits per term.
SAP requirements should be strengthened to follow students 
from one institution to another.
Continued eligibility for Pell should depend not only on meeting 
the minimal academic requirements within an institution, 
but also on performance at previous institutions. Under the 
current system, a student who loses Pell eligibility because 
of lack of academic progress at one institution can access the 
program without question at a different institution. We propose 
to strengthen the rules by tracking SAP centrally, under the 
same system that tracks Pell disbursements. A student who 
fails to meet the SAP requirements would lose eligibility for Pell 
and would not be able to qualify again before demonstrating 
academic progress at an accredited institution.17
Students should be given on-time completion bonuses of $250 
for completing an associate degree within two calendar years 
of entry or $500 for completing a bachelor’s degree within 
four calendar years of entry.
While students already can reap significant implicit benefits 
by completing their degrees in a timely manner, students may 
pay more attention to a nominal financial incentive that is 
both more concrete and more immediate. The availability of 
these awards may also place pressure on institutions to remove 
barriers to on-time completion.
The scope for gaming these awards would be limited in two 
ways. First, to limit the gratuitous awarding of associate degrees 
to bachelor’s degree students, the total award would be capped 
at $500. Students who earn the $250 associate degree bonus 
first could then receive another $250 bonus for completing 
a bachelor’s degree, for a total of $500. Second, the bonuses 
would be offered only beginning at the associate degree level. 
Because certificate programs vary widely both in their course 
requirements and their apparent labor-market returns, offering 
completion bonuses at this level may too easily lead to an 
unproductive proliferation of short certificate programs with 
uncertain labor-market value (Carnevale, Rose, and Hanson 
2012; Lang and Weinstein 2013).
The cost of these incentives would be a trivial fraction of overall 
Pell spending. Currently, only 20 percent of Pell recipients 
complete a bachelor’s degree within six years and only 10 
percent complete an associate degree within six years. If we 
made a generous assumption that, under the new incentives, 
every one of these graduates would finish on time, the cost 
would be only $125 per Pell recipient (since 20 percent of 
recipients would receive $500 and an additional 10 percent 
would receive $250). This represents less than 5 percent of the 
average annual award; given that the average student receives 
a Pell Grant for 2.6 years, $125 represents less than 2 percent 
of the typical recipient’s cumulative award. Moreover, if these 
incentives encourage course taking that is more focused, and if 
they reduce the prevalence of excess credits (more credits than 
are required to complete a degree), offering these bonuses could 
even lead to some cost savings.
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Supporting access to and success in postsecondary education has never been more important, either to our society as a whole or to individual students facing barriers 
to college enrollment and completion.
There will be hurdles to overcome in gaining support for 
our proposed Pell Grant reform, and logistical problems in 
implementing the new system. The biggest barrier to acceptance 
of the proposed approach may be the tailoring of the program to 
meet the different needs of dependent and independent students. 
There is a strong history of political support for Pell Grants, 
which is frequently viewed as a program for young people from 
low-income families. In contrast, worker-training programs, 
generally targeted at older adults, have been very poorly funded. 
See, for instance, Motoko Rich’s article in the New York Times 
(“Federal Funds to Train the Jobless are Drying Up,” April 8, 
2012) for a summary of funding trends. According to the OMB, 
federal spending on training and employment was $9.1 billion 
in 2011, the same amount in inflation-adjusted dollars as in 
2001 and 7 percent less than in 1991 (OMB 2012). The federal 
government spent $37 billion on Pell Grants in 2010–11 and 
$35 billion in 2011–12 (College Board 2012a). Even in harsh 
economic climates such as today’s, with high unemployment 
and considerable worker displacement, it is difficult to garner 
support for labor-force development programs.
Our proposals are intended to illuminate the relative 
ineffectiveness of the program for the approximately half of all 
recipients who are not recent high school graduates and are not 
seeking general education. Our economy is in desperate need 
of improving the skills of workers and ensuring that they are 
better matched to available jobs; the Pell Grant program can 
play a major role in addressing those needs.
The proposed reform of the Pell Grant program strengthens 
the coordination of Pell with other programs adults must rely 
on if they are to succeed in postsecondary education, and 
develops strategies for ensuring that these adult students will 
get the guidance they need to select educational paths with high 
probabilities of success.
Nonetheless, there is considerable status quo inertia among those 
who rightly value the accomplishments of the Pell Grant program. 
Our goal is to initiate a dialogue that will open up possibilities 
for reforming the program so that it can be even more successful 
over its second forty years than it has been to date.
logIstIcAl Issues
The current system relies on the need-analysis formula 
incorporated in the Federal Methodology that was legislated 
in 1992; it was developed from systems designed by the higher 
education community to determine parental ability to pay for 
college. The Federal Methodology includes separate formulas for 
students who are dependent on their parents, for independent 
students with dependents of their own, and for independent 
students without dependents. All students ages twenty-four and 
older are in one of the two independent categories.
Developing the appropriate guidance systems is, of course, a 
greater challenge. The structure proposed for dependent Pell 
Grant recipients would not require significant resources, but 
the structure for older students will. The first step would be 
better coordination between the Department of Labor and the 
ED. The One-Stops currently operating under the umbrella of 
the Workforce Investment Act are a promising starting point, 
but are of uneven quality and are not currently equipped to 
provide the proposed services. It is critical that the reformed 
Pell program integrate these or other institutions with efforts 
to guide adults into productive postsecondary paths instead of 
focusing on immediate labor-market outcomes. The goal is not 
to establish overlapping bureaucracies, but rather to increase 
the effectiveness of existing structures.
The federal government should provide supplemental funding 
for career assessment and counseling services for independent 
students. Evidence indicates that investing in these services greatly 
improves the effectiveness of programs that provide funding for 
training for unemployed adults. Benefits resulting from better 
choices made by students would include increased earnings 
and tax revenues and reduced unemployment compensation; 
the benefits would be likely to significantly outweigh the costs 
(Jacobson 2009). In 2011–12 there were approximately 5.6 million 
Pell recipients classified as independent, about 2.6 million of 
whom were new recipients (ED 2012). To provide each of these 
2.6 million potential Pell recipients with $500 in additional 
counseling services would require about $1.3 billion—a sum 
that would have an outsized impact on the efficacy of the tens of 
billions of dollars in total program expenditures.
Chapter 4: Implementation Issues: Logistics, Costs, 
and Winners and Losers
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During a transitional period of implementation of the proposed 
changes, current Pell recipients would be unaffected unless they 
chose to reapply under the new system. Pell eligibility for any 
dependent student who had already turned seventeen at the time 
the new system came into effect would be determined based on 
the existing system. The new eligibility system for independent 
students would require a shorter transition period. Current 
recipients could reapply annually under the older system, or 
immediately transition to the new, one-time application system.
cost ImplIcAtIons
The proposed changes to the Pell Grant program do not have to 
change the budget. Keeping the same formula but eliminating all 
data elements other than income and family size would increase 
Pell eligibility for those with significant asset levels, though it has 
been well documented that few students whose incomes are low 
enough to qualify for Pell fall into this category (Baum et al. 2012; 
Dynarski and Scott-Clayton 2006, 2007).
We are not suggesting just eliminating items from the existing, 
complex federal need-analysis formula that determines Pell 
eligibility. An alternative simple formula proposed by the 
Rethinking Pell Grants Study Group, based only on income and 
family size without regard to the number of family members 
in college, would eliminate all students from families with 
incomes above the predetermined cut-off level of, for example, 
200 percent of the poverty line. In this case, the total cost of the 
program would depend both on how many additional eligible 
students who do not now complete the complicated FAFSA 
activated the awards for which they were eligible, and on the 
level at which the funding per credit was set. Simulations suggest 
that at a maximum grant of $200 per credit (or $6,000 for thirty 
credits per year), the total costs would be approximately equal 
to those under current provisions even if all eligible students 
participated (Baum et al. 2013).
The proposed system of granting a full Pell to independent 
students whose incomes over the preceding three years fell 
below a fixed eligibility level such as 200 percent of the poverty 
line, and awards of half that amount to those with incomes 
just above this level, could also be budget-neutral. This would 
require basing the Pell award level on the current average award 
for full-time independent students.
Most important, the cost of the program would depend on the 
level of funding per credit and the separate determination of the 
income level at which the Pell award declines to zero. Nothing 
inherent in the proposed allocation system would either increase 
or decrease the total cost of the program.
If the proposed award size for independent students were set to 
maintain current average award size, some students who now 
receive the maximum Pell Grant would instead receive smaller 
awards, but many of those whose Pell eligibility is currently 
limited because of their prior labor-market earnings would 
receive larger awards. Independent students without dependents 
would benefit, while some students with dependents would 
receive smaller subsidies. Family size would be relevant because 
an income cut-off based on the poverty level would allow higher 
incomes for students with larger families. Grant sizes would 
no longer be adjusted to account for the expenditures required 
to support dependents, but students with dependents would 
benefit from increased efforts to connect them to other sources of 
funding to provide support for their families.
The added cost from the proposed program would come from 
the reforms involving counseling services. The most intensive 
services, and those requiring federal funding, would be focused 
on new enrollees. Given that these costs apply only to new 
recipients, providing every new recipient with $500 worth of 
guidance and counseling would cost about $1.3 billion, about a 4 
percent increase over current Pell spending. It would be prudent 
to pilot new guidance and counseling services on a randomized 
basis before scaling them up to all new recipients.
As discussed above in Chapter 3, it is our view that these guidance 
and counseling services are core to the success of the program and 
are worth funding even if there is a trade-off with the levels of the 
average and maximum grants. Students who start in programs 
in which they have a high probability of success are likely to have 
improved outcomes, decreasing the time and money required for 
them to achieve their goals. These savings—both to students and 
to taxpayers—will more than compensate for the investment in 
better guidance before and during postsecondary studies.
WInners And losers
The eligibility criteria could be set to approximate current 
eligibility for dependent students. In 2011, when 200 percent of 
the poverty level for a family of four was $47,100, 88 percent 
of dependent Pell Grant recipients came from families with 
incomes less than or equal to $50,000 (ED 2012, Table 6). 
However, there would certainly be some redistribution of funds. 
Among dependent students, those who receive Pell Grants only 
because they have siblings in college at the same time would 
lose eligibility. The policy reform would target the funding on 
students from lower-income families.
•	 Students	who	enroll	for	twelve	credits	per	semester	over	five	
years now receive five full Pell Grants. Those who enroll for 
the same 120 credits over four years, averaging fifteen credits 
per semester, receive only four full Pell Grants. Under the 
proposed system, these two groups of students would receive 
equal funding.
•	 Among	independent	students,	there	would	be	some	transfer	
from students with dependents to adult students with no 
dependents whose earnings have disqualified them in the 
current system.
•	 Low-income	 adult	 students	 would	 receive	 more	 funding	
from income support programs.
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How can we afford to add new guidance and outreach 
services to the Pell program when many feel the existing costs 
are already too high?
Part of the reason some may perceive current costs as too high 
is because they are dissatisfied with program results. We believe 
the program should be designed to maximize its impact on 
both student access and success per dollar of available funding, 
and that it is possible to separate questions of structure from 
questions of funding. The proposed support services would add 
costs, but potentially less than initially meets the eye because the 
services would be per recipient 
rather than per recipient per year. 
The calculated cost of $1.3 billion 
for pre-enrollment counseling 
of independent students, which 
is less than a 4 percent increase 
over current Pell spending, is 
a manageable additional cost; 
research evidence suggests it, 
like our proposed light-touch 
guidance for dependent students, 
could have a meaningful impact 
on student outcomes. If no 
additional funds are available, 
the additional services could be 
financed by setting the per credit 
award size to maintain overall cost neutrality.
Why not restrict Pell funds to students attending programs 
with a demonstrated record of student success, as measured 
by gainful employment of graduates?
The Pell Grant reforms proposed here do not depend on the 
implementation of stricter requirements for institutional 
eligibility, nor do they substitute for proposals to eliminate 
funding for programs or institutions not meeting specified 
standards for employment, earnings, or debt repayment of 
students who have graduated from or left these programs. Our 
proposals for improved student information and guidance 
should reduce the number of students entering programs with 
poor records of success. Evaluation of the merits of Gainful 
Employment regulations is beyond the scope of this paper.18 
What if simplifying the application process works so well that 
it induces many more students to enroll in college and apply 
for (and receive) Pell Grants?
This concern has been raised before with respect to the 
consequences of aid simplification. To quote Dynarski and 
Scott-Clayton’s earlier (2007) Hamilton discussion paper, 
“Currently, complexity and uncertainty keep program costs 
down by discouraging the neediest students from applying. 
This is a cowardly way to ration scarce aid funds. If we need to 
ration aid, we should do so honestly, by designing a program 
that in practice as well as principle reflects our distributional 
priorities” (p. 19). In other words, in the event of large increases 
in enrollment, rather than relying on program inefficiency to 
limit applications, we could revisit the grant schedule to ensure 
the program can absorb the costs of success.
If students can get more Pell assistance for taking more 
credits, won’t this provide an incentive for students to 
overload on courses and balloon the costs of the program as 
the summer Pell did?
To the extent that students accumulate more credits and thus 
acquire more education, typically we would see this as a good 
thing. By placing lifetime limits on eligibility, we reduce the 
potential for students to take wasteful credits, because doing 
so will leave them with fewer credits available in the future. 
Moreover, by strengthening the existing SAP requirements, we 
limit the incentives for students to take more courses than they 
Chapter 5: Questions and Concerns
The Pell program should be designed to maximize its 
impact on both student access and success per dollar 
of available funding…
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can reasonably handle in a given term. Finally, with respect to 
the summer Pell, it is worth noting that some of the additional 
costs of that initiative might be recouped if students took the 
same number of courses eventually, but simply shifted forward 
some of their planned course-taking from future semesters.
If students can get more Pell assistance for taking more 
credits, won’t this put pressure on institutions that are 
already capacity constrained?
One concern expressed by some opponents of funding students 
who enroll for more credits per semester more generously than 
those who enroll for the twelve credits currently required for 
receipt of the maximum Pell Grant is that institutional capacity 
constraints sometimes prevent students from enrolling more 
intensely. The proposed system would not differentiate between 
students who simply prefer to take fewer credits, those who 
are unable to enroll more intensely because of family and 
work responsibilities, and those limited by course availability. 
Students would not be penalized based on the pace at which they 
complete the credits required for their degrees or certificates. 
Perhaps the relationship between course availability and Pell 
funding would provide greater incentives for institutions to 
ensure that students could get the courses they need in a timely 
manner.
Shouldn’t concerns about the quality and effectiveness 
of existing One-Stops make us hesitant to require all 
independent Pell recipients to use them or services like them?
The requirement proposed here that independent students 
receive advising from a disinterested third party before enrolling 
in a postsecondary program does not depend on One-Stops. 
The fundamental idea is that these students need assistance in 
assessing their own prospects and in determining the ability of 
the many available programs to meet their needs. Institutions 
with an interest in their enrollment are not in a position to 
provide this objective guidance. We suggest the existing One-
Stop system as a starting point in order to avoid establishing 
a second parallel bureaucratic structure, but it is possible that 
the whole system should be replaced. A number of experts have 
proposed reform of the existing One-Stop system (e.g., Jacobson 
2009; Strong 2013).
Our intent is to stimulate discussion of the best approach to 
meeting this need and to encourage experiments with rigorous 
evaluation of alternative approaches. The idea is to support 
services that will supplement those provided by institutions, 
particularly those in the for-profit sector and in community 
colleges; these institutions educate the vast majority of 
independent students.
What happens to students who are under age twenty-four, 
but are considered independent under current rules, for 
example because they are veterans, married, or have children 
of their own?
If these students grew up in a low-income family, then they 
would have eligibility as dependent students based on their 
family’s income when they were aged fourteen to sixteen. This 
eligibility would remain available until the students turn twenty-
four. However, students who would be considered independent 
under current rules could choose to apply as independent 
students at any age. Students would not be allowed to receive 
grants under more than one eligibility formula simultaneously.
What happens to students who are initially eligible for Pell 
as a dependent student, but don’t finish their degrees by age 
twenty-four?
When dependent students receiving Pell reach the age of twenty-
four, they are no longer eligible for any unused funds as dependent 
Pell recipients, and would need to reapply as independent students. 
Their use of Pell funds as dependent recipients would count 
toward the number of credits for which they would be eligible as 
independent students (i.e., eligibility under both statuses would 
count toward lifetime eligibility caps, as is true under the current 
system). In practice, a student who has been enrolled full-time for 
several years prior to age twenty-four is likely to have low enough 
earnings to qualify for assistance as a newly independent student 
(as is also true in the current system).
Though reapplication would be required at the point a 
student becomes independent, this single reapplication is a 
significant improvement on the current system, which requires 
reapplication every year a student is enrolled.
The proposed Pell Grant reforms focus on modifying student 
choices and behaviors to improve their postsecondary success. 
Don’t we also have to change the way institutions perform 
in order to ensure that more Pell Grant recipients earn the 
degrees and certificates to which they aspire?
Improving the success of Pell Grant recipients certainly requires 
changes at the institutional level. This likely requires directing 
students to institutions with stronger records as well as improved 
guidance, support, and instruction within institutions. Changes 
to institutional eligibility for participation in Pell are beyond 
the scope of this paper. We have supported elsewhere proposals 
that direct some funds associated with the Pell program to 
institutions, based on their success in supporting Pell recipients 
through their studies (Baum et al. 2013; Rethinking Student 
Aid Study Group 2008). It is important to note that we support 
basing funds provided directly to institutions on their success 
in educating Pell Grant recipients, but oppose linking the Pell 
Grant awards available to individual students on any rating 
system applied to institutions that meet the qualifications for 
receipt of Title IV student aid.
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The federal Pell Grant program has transformed the lives of many Americans who would not have had access to postsecondary education without this support. But it 
was designed forty years ago with a focus on recent high school 
graduates from low-income families for whom the primary 
barrier to a college degree was lack of funds. Today, over half 
of all Pell Grants are awarded to students without regard to 
their parents’ financial circumstances, because almost half of 
the recipients are over the age of twenty-four, and 60 percent 
are independent. A significant portion of the funding is used 
for short-term occupation-specific programs, many of which 
are offered in for-profit institutions. Too many students, 
particularly among those returning to school after time in the 
labor force, never earn postsecondary credentials. It is time 
to restructure the program to better serve current and future 
students.
We propose augmenting the program with guidance and 
supports tailored for dependent and independent students. 
Dependent students would receive enhanced outreach and 
light-touch coaching through their first year of college, while 
independent recipients would receive guidance and assessment 
from disinterested third parties to help them choose the most 
appropriate courses of study before enrolling. For all students, 
the application process and eligibility criteria would be simpler 
and more predictable. The program’s structure would do more 
than it now does to support student success.
For all students, Pell eligibility would depend on three years of 
income history as reported by the IRS. But small differences in 
family income would affect the size of the Pell Grants only for 
dependent students. Independent students would qualify for a 
full grant, half a grant, or no grant. The Pell program would 
determine eligibility automatically for all seventeen-year-olds 
and these awards would remain available for those students 
through age twenty-four. Independent students would simply 
apply when they are ready to enroll.
Award levels would be based on the number of credits for which 
students are enrolled. Students would receive more funding if 
they enrolled for more courses, including courses over summer 
terms; this would encourage them to progress toward their 
degree goals in a timely manner. Students would have to show 
progress to continue receiving Pell Grants, even if they moved 
from one institution to another.
A simpler Pell Grant program focused on student success and 
tailored to the needs of both traditional college-aged students 
and older students seeking to improve their labor-market skills 
will be more effective for both students and taxpayers.
Chapter 6: Conclusion
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Endnotes
1.  In 2011–12, 37 percent of 25.5 million undergraduate students received 
Pell Grants, an increase from 22 percent of 19.8 million undergraduates 
a decade earlier (College Board 2012b, Table 14a).
2.  Independent students are typically at least twenty-four years old and 
are considered financially independent of their parents for purposes of 
financial need determination. Younger students are considered indepen-
dent only if they have children, are married, or meet one of several other 
specific criteria such as being an orphan or a veteran.
3.  Segmenting the population by age leads to similar findings. Among 
students who began their studies at age twenty-five or older, 37 percent 
earned a credential within six years, including 3 percent who earned 
bachelor’s degrees.
4.  The evidence on persistence or completion is less clear. See Dynarski and 
Scott-Clayton (2013) for a recent review.
5.  The 2007–08 statistics are based on tuition and fees minus all grants, and 
account for actual intensity of enrollment (full-time or part-time status).
6.  A separate study by Bos and colleagues (2012) of the SOURCE peer-to-
peer advising program in California, which provided approximately nine 
hours of guidance to each student over the course of a year at the end of 
high school, also showed large effects, but was substantially more expen-
sive at $1,000 per student.
7.  The concern about Pell’s ability to effectively serve multiple populations 
has been raised recently by the Rethinking Pell Grants Study Group, in 
which both authors participated. Our proposal incorporates and ex-
pands on several ideas that group raised.
8.  The pattern is similar if we segment the population by age instead of 
dependency status. Almost half of all undergraduates (39 percent of Pell 
recipients) who began their studies at age twenty-four or younger en-
rolled in bachelor’s degree programs, while only 10 percent of all under-
graduates (9 percent of Pell recipients) age twenty-five or older took this 
path. 
9.  According to data from the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study 
(NCES 2008), 39 percent of 2007–08 associate degree students who be-
gan their studies after age twenty-four were in occupational or technical 
programs, compared to 29 percent of those who began their studies at an 
earlier age.
10.  Conversely, 80 percent of Pell recipients aged twenty-three or younger 
are classified as dependent.
11.  Authors’ calculations using Beginning Postsecondary Students Longitu-
dinal Study (NCES 2009) data via NCES Data Lab (calendar months 
elapsed to first degree, for associate degree recipients).
12.  Examples include MyEdu, uAspire, and InsideTrack.
13.  For an evaluation of the counseling and career services provided at 
Workforce Investment Act–funded One-Stop Centers, see Heinrich et 
al. (2009). Another study of individual training accounts used at Work-
force Investment Act–funded centers found that a mandatory counseling 
requirement may have discouraged study participants from using those 
services, but noted that it was only the anticipation of counseling, and 
not the counseling itself, that appears to have discouraged participants. 
That study suggested that providing better information on the nature of 
required counseling services from the outset could mitigate the problem 
(Perez-Johnson, Moore, and Santillano 2011).
14.  The system would accommodate other family structures. The financial 
circumstances of any adult claiming a seventeen-year-old as a dependent 
on her tax form would serve as the basis for Pell Grant eligibility.
15.  Note that the rationale for treating these individuals as independents un-
der the current system is the impracticality of obtaining parental income 
information for students who may already have established their own 
households. Under our system, this is not an issue since parental income 
information is obtained from the high school years and eligibility is 
then fixed at age seventeen. Individuals who grew up in middle-class or 
wealthy families, and thus are not eligible for Pell as dependent students, 
could still apply as independent students if they meet the criteria; we 
think it is unlikely that this flexibility would induce many such individu-
als to get married or have children solely to influence their Pell eligibility. 
(To the extent there is potential for gaming, it is already present in the 
existing rules.)
16.  Reliance on the credit hour as a measure of student progress is currently 
under debate. We assume that modifications of the credit hour system 
will leave in place some unit for measuring student progress, which 
could easily be substituted for credit hours in our system.
17.  SAP requirements vary by institution and would continue to do so under 
the proposed system, as long as students’ SAP status is reported centrally. 
A typical SAP requirement is that students maintain a minimum GPA of 
2.0 and complete at least two-thirds of credits attempted.
18.  See Jacobson (2009) for discussion of the need for better data on the 
employment outcomes of Pell recipients.
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Highlights
In a new Hamilton Project discussion paper, Sandy Baum of the Urban Institute and The George 
Washington University and Judith Scott-Clayton of Teachers College, Columbia University, propose 
three major structural reforms to the current Pell Grant system, each tailored to the different 
circumstances of independent and dependent students.
The Proposal
Establish guidance and support services tailored for both dependent and independent students. 
All students need better information and guidance about the educational programs and institutions in 
which they have a reasonable chance of succeeding, the employment and graduate study options likely to 
be available when they complete their studies, and the costs they will incur. Independent students, most 
of whom have work and/or family responsibilities, face barriers to success that are different from those 
faced by dependent students, most of whom are recent high school graduates, so the authors suggest 
slightly different services for each group.
simplify the current eligibility and application process to allow for easier access to Pell Grants. 
When young people reach the age of seventeen, the Pell program would automatically calculate their Pell 
Grant eligibility based on their parents’ tax returns for the prior three years. For most students, eligibility 
would be based on just income and family size, and for all, eligibility would be fixed for multiple years. 
This would greatly reduce the financial uncertainty that students face when beginning a postsecondary 
program and eliminate the problem of students failing to reapply for aid each year.
Enhance timely completion incentives to support student success. Students would be funded 
according to the number of credits for which they are enrolled, so that recipients who want to finish on 
time are no longer penalized relative to those who stretch out their studies. Students would be eligible for 
Pell Grants to cover up to 125 percent of the credits required for their specific degree or certificate, up to 
a lifetime maximum of 150 credits, and those who finish on time would receive a small bonus.
Benefits
The proposed Pell Grant reforms would for the first time make Pell a true program with students as 
participants, and not just a grant with students as recipients, and would increase the likelihood that 
beneficiaries will succeed in college. Moreover, the program would be tailored to the different needs 
of dependent and independent students, and would better achieve the array of goals it has grown to 
serve. Access to higher education for low-income students of all circumstances would be improved, and 
students would be incentivized to complete their degrees in a more-timely manner at a lower cost both to 
them and to the Pell Grant program.
